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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4268 
___________ 
 
REUEL NACKMU MEBUIN, 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                         Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A076-415-483) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret Reichenberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 18, 2014 
Before:  SMITH, GARTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 24, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Reuel Nackmu Mebuin, a native and citizen of Cameroon, filed a petition for review of 
an October 19, 2012 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  We appointed 
counsel and the case is now fully briefed.  In the meantime, however, Mebuin, proceeding pro 
se, filed a motion to reopen with the BIA, claiming ineffective assistance of prior counsel.  The 
  
BIA granted the motion to reopen on February 12, 2014, and remanded to an Immigration 
Judge to give Mebuin “the opportunity to present applications for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and cancellation of removal under section 240A(a).”1  The Government argues that 
there is no longer a final order of removal; Mebuin strenuously argues that this Court retains 
jurisdiction because his removability may not be challenged in the reopened proceedings.  We 
agree with the Government that we no longer have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s October 
2012 decision.
2
 
 This Court’s jurisdiction is limited to final orders of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2002).  While an agency order may 
satisfy the finality requirement at the time the petition for review is first filed, subsequent 
administrative proceedings can affect finality, limiting or eliminating the jurisdiction of the 
reviewing court of appeals.  Most significantly, “the grant of a motion to reopen vacates the 
previous order of deportation or removal and reinstates the previously terminated immigration 
proceedings.”  Bronisz v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2004).  This holds true even if 
reopening is limited to a subset of the alien’s original claims.  See Lopez-Ruiz v. Ashcroft, 298 
F.3d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); cf. Chupina v. Holder, 570 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 
2009) (per curiam) (concluding that a BIA order, which affirmed the denial of asylum but 
remanded on withholding and CAT, was not final because the remanded matters could directly 
affect removability).   Mebuin cites Yusupov v. Attorney General, 518 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 
2008) for the proposition that we may retain jurisdiction even when some issues are remanded 
                                              
1
 The BIA stated that it “intimate[d] no opinion regarding the respondent’s statutory eligibility 
2
 Although we lack jurisdiction, we thank counsel for agreeing to take this case pro bono and 
commend them for their excellent briefing. 
  
to an immigration judge.  But that decision is readily distinguished.  In Yusupov, the BIA 
remanded proceedings “for the purpose of allowing [DHS] the opportunity to complete or 
update identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations, and further 
proceedings, if necessary, and for the entry of an order as provided by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h).”  
Id. at 196 (alterations in original).  We observed that the resolution of those “administrative 
matters” would not “affect the controlling removal determination,” and hence found it proper 
to exercise our jurisdiction to review what was otherwise a final order.  Id.  In this case, 
however, the Immigration Judge is authorized to consider substantive matters that may result in 
giving Mebuin relief from removal.  Further, the BIA has ordered the Immigration Judge to 
enter “a new decision,” in effect, vacating the prior order of removal.  Cf. Thomas v. Att’y 
Gen., 625 F.3d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 2010) (where BIA decision granted motion for 
reconsideration simply to correct factual mischaracterization but did not vacate or substantially 
modify earlier removal order, earlier order continues to present live controversy for judicial 
review).  Accordingly, because the earlier BIA order is no longer final, we hold that we lack 
jurisdiction over this petition for review.   
Our decision today in no way precludes Mebuin from seeking judicial review of the 
BIA’s October 2012 decision once the agency has fully adjudicated any applications and 
entered a final order.  Chupina, 570 F.3d at 105.  If any future petition for review is necessary 
here, Mebuin will be able to raise (i) any reviewable issues that, but for the BIA’s remand 
order, he could have raised in this proceeding, as well as (ii) any exhausted reviewable issues 
relating to the remanded proceedings.  Lopez-Ruiz, 298 F.3d at 887. 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the petition for review.
3
 
 
 
 
                                              
3
 All outstanding motions are denied as moot. 
